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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 930305-CA 
v. : 
MAXIMO RAMON RAMOS, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for distribution of 
a controlled substance, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (ii) (1990) . 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1993). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by 
refusing to strike for cause a prospective juror whose only 
potential source of ~ias was prior employment as a police 
dispatcher? 
Whether to dismiss a prospective juror for cause is 
within the discretion of the trial court. As the reviewing 
court, this Court "must 'presume that the discretion of the trial 
court was properly exercised unless the record clearly shows the 
contrary.'" State v. Morgan, No. 910449-CA, slip op. at 5 (Utah 
App. December 17, 1993) (quoting State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902, 
906 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990)). 
See also State v. Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459, 462 (Utah 1989). 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by 
admitting defendant's photograph to prove defendant's identity 
after defendant opened the door to its admission by using the 
picture to cross-examine Detective Lucas about his identification 
procedure? 
The admission of relevant evidence is governed by the 
abuse of discretion standard. Defendant must demonstrate that 
the trial court's decision to admit the evidence was "beyond the 
limits of reasonability." State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 
1241 (Utah 1993) (quoting State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 
(Utah 1992)), cert, denied, 114 S.Ct. 476 (1993); see also State 
v. Wetzel, No. 920466, slip op. at 3 (Utah Dec. 3, 1993) 
("Deciding whether evidence is relevant ordinarily requires a 
balancing of factors, and we will reverse a determination of 
relevancy only if the trial court abused its discretion"). 
3. Did the trial court properly limit irrelevant and 
repetitive cross-examination of Detective Lucas? 
This Court reviews a trial court's decision to limit 
cross-examination under the abuse of discretion standard. "The 
trial judge has discretion to limit examination 'to preclude 
repetitive and unduly harassing interrogation' or to prevent 
parties from embarking on 'fishing expeditions'." State v. 
Lactod, 761 P.2d 23, 25 (Utah App. 1988) (citations omitted). 
See also Wetzel, slip op. at 3 ("Deciding whether evidence is 
relevant ordinarily requires a balancing of factors, and we will 
reverse a determination of relevancy only if the trial court 
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abused its discretion"). Furthermore, defendant must demonstrate 
that any abuse of discretion by the trial court in limiting 
cross-examination prejudiced his right to a fair trial. State v. 
Maestas, 564 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah 1977) ("[s]hould the trial 
court err in unduly limiting the cross-examination such may not 
be reversible error without a showing of prejudice"). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and 
district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed . . . . 
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution 
provides: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
have the right . . . to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or 
district in which the offense is alleged to 
have been committed . . . . 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18(e) (4) provides that 
a potential juror should be stricken for cause when the 
challenging party demonstrates: 
the existence of any social, legal, business, 
fiduciary or other relationship between the 
prospective juror and any party, witness or 
person alleged to have been victimized or 
injured by the defendant, which relationship 
when viewed objectively, would suggest to 
reasonable minds that the prospective juror 
would be unable or unwilling to return a 
verdict that would be free of favoritism. 
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Rule 18(e) (14) states that a juror should also be 
stricken if a party demonstrates: 
that a state of mind exists on the part of 
the juror with reference to the cause, or to 
either party, which will prevent him from 
acting impartially and without prejudice to 
the substantial rights of the party 
challenging . . . . 
Utah Rule of Evidence 403 provides: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 4 04(b) provides: 
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of 
other crimes, wrongs or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person 
in order to show action in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible 
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with distribution of a 
controlled substance, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1990) (R. 7-8). A jury found 
defendant guilty (R. 219). The trial court sentenced defendant 
to 1-15 years in prison, a fine of $500 plus surcharge, and $500 
restitution (R. 223). The court stayed the imposition of the 
prison sentence and placed defendant on 36 months probation (R. 
223). Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 225). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A. Defendant's Crime 
Detective Edward Lucas contacted defendant's roommate 
at the Grand Hotel to arrange the purchase of cocaine on January 
31, 1992 (R. 376-777). Acting undercover, Detective Lucas went 
to the hotel, met defendant in the lobby and informed defendant 
of the pending purchase of a half ounce of cocaine for $500 (R. 
376-77, 380, 385). Defendant told the detective to return in 20-
30 minutes (R. 380). When the detective returned, defendant was 
waiting in the lobby (R. 381). The two went upstairs to 
defendant's room (R. 382). Once in the room, defendant engaged 
in conversation with Pedro Garcia in Spanish (R. 3 83). Defendant 
then made a phone call and asked the detective if he had a 
vehicle (R. 385). 
Defendant, Detective Lucas, and Garcia drove in 
Detective Lucas's truck to an apartment building in Salt Lake 
City (R. 386-387). Once there, Detective Lucas handed Garcia 
five $100 bills (388). Defendant snatched the money from Garcia 
and closely examined the bills (R. 389-90, 437). Defendant gave 
Garcia the money (R. 390). Garcia took the money, exited the 
truck, entered the apartment building, returned and handed 
defendant a package filled with cocaine (R. 390-91, 470-71, 437). 
Defendant handed the cocaine to Detective Lucas (R. 438). 
B. Trial Court Proceedings 
During jury voir dire, defendant challenged prospective 
juror Scholle for cause based on Mr. Scholle's prior employment 
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as a police dispatcher (R. 347-48). However, the court 
implicitly found credible Mr. Scholle's assertions that his prior 
employment would not affect his ability to be a fair and 
impartial juror (R. 317, 348) Correction Sheet to Transcript, 
attached as Addendum A. Therefore, the trial court denied the 
challenge (R. 348). Defendant peremptorily struck Mr. Scholle 
(R. 153). 
Detective Lucas testified about his undercover work and 
his methods of obtaining evidence (R. 371, 373-376, 393-95). 
Defendant conducted an extensive cross-examination of the 
detective about those practices (R. 405-415, 423-427). On cross-
examination, defendant elicited testimony regarding the 
detective's picture identification of defendant (R. 439). On re-
direct, the State sought admission of the pictures elicited by 
defendant on cross-examination (R. 442-446). The court allowed 
the admission of the picture only after cutting away the bottom 
of the frontal view (R. 4 90) Exhibit 3, attached as Addendum B. 
Defendant's closing argument emphasized the deceptive aspects of 
undercover police methods (R. 577, 579-81). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly refused to excuse prospective 
juror Scholle for cause. Mr. Scholle indicated that he would be 
fair and impartial. Defendant does not assert on appeal that Mr. 
Scholle was biased, nor did Mr. Scholle ever exhibit any signs of 
bias. Defendant based his challenge solely on Mr. Scholle's 
prior employment as a police dispatcher. Such a per se rule of 
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disqualification for undemonstrated bias is unnecessary and 
unsupported by Utah law. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
admitting defendant's pictures into evidence. Defendant elicited 
this evidence on cross-examination by questioning Detective Lucas 
regarding his identification of defendant. Defendant cannot 
complain about evidence introduced when he knowingly elicited 
that evidence on cross-examination. 
Defendant conductec an extensive cross-examination of 
Detective Lucas regarding the methods of his undercover work. 
This cross-examination sufficiently brought before the jury any 
bias or motivation to testify the detective might have. The 
trial court properly limited defendant's irrelevant and 
repetitive cross-examination. Furthermore, defendant obtained 
sufficient information from that cross-examination to argue his 
view of bias to the jury. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS 
DISCRETION BY REFUSING TO REMOVE POTENTIAL 
JUROR SCHCLLE FOR CAUSE 
Defendant challenged prospective juror Scholle for 
cause based on Mr. Scholle's prior employment as a police 
dispatcher. The trial court refused to excuse Mr. Scholle for 
cause after weighing the credibility of Mr. Scholle's responses 
during voir dire and determining that Mr. Scholle could be a fair 
and impartial juror. Defendant's subsequently removed Mr. 
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Scholle from further participation in the trial by peremptory 
challenge. The trial court, based on its determination that Mr. 
Scholle answered truthfully during voir dire and that Mr. Scholle 
was not biased by his prior employment, properly exercised its 
discretion by refusing to remove Mr. Scholle for cause. 
A. Standard of Review 
Whether to dismiss a prospective juror for cause is 
within the discretion of the trial court. As the reviewing 
court, this Court "must 'presume that the discretion of the trial 
court was properly exercised unless the record clearly shows the 
contrary.'" State v. Morgan, No. 910449-CA, slip op. at 5 (Utah 
App. December 17, 1993) (quoting State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902, 
906 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990)). 
See also State v. Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459, 462 (Utah 1989). 
Furthermore, Utah cases hold that when a party moves to 
strike a prospective juror for cause, the strike is erroneously 
denied, and the party exercises a peremptory challenge to remove 
the prospective juror, that prejudicial error is assumed.1 See, 
e.g., State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 451 (Utah 1988); State v. 
xThe State has consistently argued that this rule, announced 
without analysis in Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091, 1093 
(Utah 1975), should be abandoned. An automatic reversal of a 
conviction based on possible bias of a prospective juror who 
never considers the evidence or participates in the trial is 
unsound as a matter of law and public policy. The Utah and 
United States Constitutions guarantee a defendant an impartial 
jury, not an impartial venire panel. Utah Const, art. I, § 12, 
U.S. Const, amend. VI. There is no indication in the record that 
defendant was denied this right. The Utah Supreme Court is 
currently considering the State's position in the capital murder 
case, State v. Menzies, No. 880161. See Brief of Appellee, State 
v. Menzies, No. 880161, 43-52, attached as Addendum C. 
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Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 25 (Utah 1984); State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 
878, 883 (Utah 1981); Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533, 536 (Utah 
1981); State v. Bailev. 605 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah 1980); State v. 
Brooks, 563 P.2d 799, 802-03 (Utah 1977). 
B. Permissible Grounds for Removing a 
Prospective Juror for Cause 
In order to demonstrate a prospective juror should be 
stricken for cause, the challenging party must demonstrate to the 
trial court the existence of one of fourteen conditions. Utah R. 
Crim. P. 18(e) (1-14) . 
Rule 18(e) (4) provides that a prospective juror should 
be excused where the challenging party demonstrates 
the existence of any social, legal, business, 
fiduciary or other relationship between the 
prospective juror and any party, witness or 
person alleged to have been victimized or 
injured by the defendant, which relationship 
when viewed objectively, would suggest to 
reasonable minds that the prospective juror 
would be unable or unwilling to return a 
verdict that would be free of favoritism. 
A juror should also be stricken if a party 
demonstrates: 
that a state of mind exists on the part of 
the juror with reference to the cause, or to 
either party, which will prevent him from 
acting impartially and without prejudice to 
the substantial rights of the party 
challenging . . . 
Rule 18(e)(14). 
C. Defendant's Proposed Rule 
Defendant urges this Court to adopt a per se rule that 
anyone formerly associated with a law enforcement office is 
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inferentially biased. Br. of App. at 10 ("The question that was 
asked, and answer given, do nothing to dispel the inference of 
bias raised by Mr. Scholle's employment in law enforcement 
agencies.") This type of per se rule of bias has no foundation 
in either law or logic. 
The general rule is that former police officers are not 
considered to be biased jurors. 
An analysis of the cases in which courts have 
considered whether former law enforcement 
officers are qualified jurors indicates a 
consistent holding on the part of the courts 
that a person's status as a former law 
enforcement officer does not disqualify him 
as impliedly biased from serving as a juror 
in a criminal case. 
Annotation, Former Law Enforcement Officers as Qualified Jurors 
in Criminal Cases, 72 A.L.R.3d 958, 960 (1976). If former police 
officers are not seen as inherently biased, a former dispatcher 
should likewise not be seen as inherently biased. Cf. State v. 
Gray, 851 P.2d 1217, 1223 (Utah App. 1993) (trial court did not 
abuse its discretion when it refused to remove for cause a 
prospective juror who served as a highway patrol officer), cert. 
denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993). Here, Mr. Scholle was not a 
"former law enforcement officer," but rather a dispatcher who was 
never involved with investigating crime or testifying in court 
(R. 316-317). 
Defendant claims that Mr. Scholle's prior employment is 
sufficient to show a "legal, business . . . or other 
relationship" between Mr. Scholle and Detective Lucas. Utah R. 
Crim. P. 18(e)(4), Br. of App. at 9-10. However, Mr. Scholle's 
10 
work as a dispatcher in Midvale cannot reasonably seen as a 
relationship with a Murray Police Officer that would influence 
him to such an extent "that [Mr. Scholle] would be unable or 
unwilling to return a verdict that would be free of favoritism." 
Id. Mr. Scholle would have been an unbiased juror. 
D. Trial Court's Voir Dire 
The trial court specifically asked the jury panel if 
anyone knew the detective and displayed a picture of the 
detective to ensure there was no relationship between any of the 
potential jurors and the detective: 
The record may reflect each of the panel 
members have had an opportunity to review the 
photograph. I would like to know whether or 
not any member of the panel knows or is 
familiar with or has any relationship 
whatsoever with the individual who is 
depicted in the photograph, Det. Lucas, who 
at this time went by the name of Bobby? And 
if so, would you please indicate this by 
raising your hand at this time. (Pause) The 
record may reflect that there are no hands 
raised. 
(R. 273-274), Exhibit 1, attached as Addendum D. 
Defendant's challenge below and in this appeal ignores 
the trial court's careful voir dire of the entire jury panel2 
and Mr. Scholle's repeated assertions that he would be impartial 
and base his decision on the evidence presented (R. 256-57, 265-
67, 306, 309-10, 316-317, 326-27, 339-40, 342). He likewise 
ignores the fact that the trial court specifically asked Mr. 
2The voir dire consists of 95 pages of transcript (R. 250-
344). The entire transcript of the two day trial is only 354 
pages (R. 250-603). 
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Scholle if his prior employment would affect his judgment, Mr. 
Scholle responded "[i]t wouldn't affect my opinion" (R.317) 
Addendum A.3 Furthermore, defendant does not claim that Mr. 
Scholle was biased, but merely asserts that there was a potential 
or inference of bias. Br. of App. at 10, 12-14. 
This Court and the Utah Supreme Court have consistently 
held that if a prospective juror exhibits signs of bias that 
counsel, or the trial court, must ensure that the inference of 
bias is rebutted. See, e.g., State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123, 1126 
(Utah 1989); Bishop, 753 P.2d at 451; Bailey, 605 P.2d at 768; 
State v. Bovatt, 854 P.2d 550, 552 (Utah App. 1993), cert, 
denied, 862 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993); State v. Kavmark, 839 P.2d 
860, 862 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 
1993); State v. Cox, 826 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah App. 1992); State v. 
Woollev, 810 P.2d 440, 443 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 826 
P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). Here, Mr. Scholle's position as a former 
dispatcher was insufficient to demonstrate bias as a matter of 
law. Furthermore, the trial court's careful voir dire 
3The State recognizes that the relevant portion of the 
transcript records Mr. Scholle's response as fl[i]t would affect 
my opinion" (R. 317) (emphasis added). However, after the State 
questioned the court reporter about the accuracy of this 
transcription, the reporter filed a correction with this Court 
which accurately reflects Mr. Scholle's response as "[i]t 
wouldn't affect my opinion." See Addendum A (emphasis added). 
The State contacted defendant's appellate counsel and offered to 
stipulate to a motion for a stay of the briefing schedule to 
allow counsel to respond to the correction. Counsel indicated 
that the correction would not affect his argument. See Addendum 
E. 
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demonstrated that Mr. Scholle's experience would not render him a 
biased juror: 
THE COURT: Now, taking those 
responsibilities into consideration, and 
taking into cc :deration that Ms. McCloskey 
has identified une potential that law 
enforcement officers or police officers may 
testify in this case, I would like to know if 
there is any member of the iurv panel that 
would give the testimony of a law enforcement 
officer more weight solely because that 
individual bore the title of being a law 
enforcement officer or police would be in 
uniform, cloaked with the badge of authority, 
so to speak? But I would like to know if 
there is any member of the panel who would 
give the testimony of a law enforcement 
officer more weight solely because that 
individual was a law enforcement officer? 
An [dl if so, would you please indicate this 
by raising your hand at this time. (Pause) 
The record may reflect that there are no 
hands raised. . . . What I would like to know 
is whether or not, members of the panel, any 
of you have ever been employed in a law 
enforcement capacity. Also, I would like to 
know whether or not any of you have any close 
friends or close family members who are 
employed as law enforcement officers and if 
so, would you please indicate this by raising 
your hand at this time. . . [six potential 
jurors indicated they fit this category] 
(emphasis added). 
THE COURT: Did I miss any hands raised? I 
thought I did. Mr. Scholle. 
MR. SCHOLLE: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Who were you thinking of, sir? 
MR. SCHOLLE: I was employed 20 years as a 
dispatcher. Ten years it was part-time 
second job with Midvale City Police. And 
then I worked eight years for the County 
Sheriff's Department in Cleveland, Ohio. 
THE COURT: In what capacity? 
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MR. SCHOLLE: As a dispatcher and then twice 
-- once for six months on a temporary job, 
and then about a year with the Salt Lake 
County Police as a dispatcher. 
THE COURT: So the occasions that you were 
employed with law enforcement offices or 
agencies was as a dispatcher; is that 
correct? 
MR. SCHOLLE: It has always been as a 
dispatcher, yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Were you ever involved in the 
investigative phase of any alleged criminal 
offense? 
MR. SCHOLLE: Well, I used to use the 
computer all the time to find people. 
THE COURT: Well, no, I want to know in the 
capacity that you were employed working for 
law enforcement agencies, were you ever 
involved in the investigation phase? 
MR. SCHOLLE: Of a specific crime, you mean? 
THE COURT: Yes, sir. 
MR. SCHOLLE: No, never. 
THE COURT: Did you ever testify as a witness 
or anything of that nature? 
MR. SCHOLLE: No. 
THE COURT: Do you think that experience, Mr. 
Scholle, that you described would prevent you 
from being fair and impartial if you were a 
juror in today's case? 
MR. SCHOLLE: It wouldn't affect my opinion. 
(R. 309-311, 316-317) addendum A, note 3 supra. The trial court 
believed these statements to be true and defendant offers no 
record evidence to contradict that determination. 
Subsequently, the trial court denied defendant's 
challenge for cause: 
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And I am going to deny that challenge for 
cause. I think he responded that he could be 
fair and impartial. He was employed only in 
a dispatch capacity, even though I would 
imagine that probably brought him into 
contact with other law enforcement officers. 
The Court is not persuaded that is a proper 
challenge for cause. 
(R. 348). 
Ignoring this entire line of questioning and the trial 
court's finding, defendant complains on appeal that the court 
failed to "further probe [Mr. Scholle's] attitudes and feelings 
towards law enforcement officers" and that "[t]he rehabilitative 
efforts in this case were inadequate, and at most pro forma." 
Br. of App. at 10, 12. However, as demonstrated above, the trial 
court conducted an extensive voir dire into any possible bias 
towards police officers and determined that Mr. Scholle did not 
demonstrate any bias.4 
Given the trial court's correct determination that 
prior employment as a dispatcher is insufficient to raise an 
inference of bias, and the court's careful questioning about Mr. 
Scholle's duties as a dispatcher, there was no need for 
additional questioning of Mr. Scholle. 
4The trial court did not hesitate to strike two potential 
jurors for cause when the court found a possibility of bias. The 
court struck Ms. Billings for cause when he found her hesitation 
to answer a question about drug victims to raise "serious 
questions of whether or [not] she could be fair and impartial in 
deciding this particular case." (R. 346). The court likewise 
struck Mr. Nash for cause because "he indicated his step-son died 
of an overdose and considering that this case involves a 
distribution charge, I think that he is a proper challenge for 
cause for those reasons." (R. 347). 
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However, if this Court determines that the trial court 
clearly erred by not recognizing an inference of bias, the trial 
court specifically asked Mr. Scholle if his prior employment 
would affect his opinion as a juror (R. 316-317) Addendum A. 
This single question was sufficient to dispel any possible 
inference of bias in light of the careful probing by the trial 
court into Mr. Scholle's previous experience. State v. Brooks, 
No. 920853-CA, slip op. at 11 n. 4 (Utah App. October 29, 1993) 
(noting that in Hornsby v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 758 P.2d 929, 
932 (Utah App. 1988) cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1988), that 
this Court "held that 'the question asked by the trial court was 
sufficient to detect any actual subjective bias to warrant a 
challenge for cause . . . " ) . Therefore, no additional 
questioning was required. 
E. Defendant Waived any Additional 
Questioning by Not Requesting Additional Voir 
Dire 
Furthermore, defendant never requested that the trial 
court ask additional questions of Mr. Scholle. He has, 
therefore, waived any failure of the trial court to further 
question Mr. Scholle. See State v. DeMille. 756 P.2d 81, 83 
(Utah 1988) ("We therefore hold that DeMille's failure to voir 
dire the jurors on this quite foreseeable issue or object to the 
trial court's failure to cover the issue constitutes a waiver and 
bars inquiry into the bias question"); State v. Miller, 674 P.2d 
130, 131 (Utah 1983) ("Counsel neither objected, reminded the 
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judge of the oversight, made a new request, nor asked permission 
personally to voir dire the jury under U.C.A. 1953, § 77-35-
18(b). Such failure effectively waived the error . . . " ) . 5 
Mr. Scholle denied knowing the witness and continually 
indicated that he would be fair and impartial. (R. 256-57, 265-
67, 306, 309-10, 316-317, 326-27, 339-40, 342). Defendant's 
position that Mr. Scholle violated his oath to answer questions 
truthfully during voir dire (R. 253) is unsupported by the 
record. The trial court properly exercised its discretion by 
refusing to strike Mr. Scholle for cause. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT CANNOT COMPLAIN ON APPEAL ABOUT THE 
ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE HE KNOWINGLY ELICITED 
ON CROSS-EXAMINATION 
Defendant asserts that the introduction of his "mug 
shots" requires this Court to reverse his conviction based on the 
theory that the pictures brought evidence of his prior criminal 
activity to the jury's attention. Br. of App. at 14-26. 
However, the photographs were only introduced after he questioned 
Detective Lucas about the pictures. Furthermore, the pictures 
were admissible to prove identity since the question of the 
identity of the person who participated in the drug deal with 
Detective Lucas was defendant's main focus at trial. 
5The trial court did not limit voir dire. Specifically, the 
court asked a follow-up question when the State was unsatisfied 
about the effectiveness of a particular question (R. 322-23, 324-
25). Nothing in the record suggests that the court would not 
have asked additional questions if defendant had requested those 
questions. 
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A. Defendant Cannot Complain on Appeal About 
Evidence He Elicited on Cross-Examination 
The Utah Supreme Court's holding in State v. Barney, 
681 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1984) disposes of this issue on appeal: 
While evidence of the defendant's criminal 
character may be, and generally is, excluded 
under Rule 55 when such evidence is elicited 
or offered by the prosecution to prove its 
case-in-chief, the same evidence may not be 
excludable under the said rule when the 
responsibility for its introduction may be 
traced to the defendant. . . . Under such 
circumstances, the alleged error was invited 
by defendant's own counsel, and thus 
defendant is in no position to request a 
mistrial. 
Barney, 681 P.2d at 1231. See also State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 
1220 (Utah 1993) ("We have held repeatedly that on appeal, a 
party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when 
that party led the trial court into committing the error"); State 
v. Lopez, 626 P.2d 483, 485 (Utah 1981) ("if the defendant 
himself opens up the subject as to prior incidents, it becomes 
subject to cross-examination and refutation the same as any other 
evidence"). 
Detective Lucas did not state how he made his initial 
identification of defendant on direct examination. However, 
during cross-examination of Detective Lucas, defendant questioned 
the detective about the method used to identify defendant (R. 
439-40)6: 
60n appeal, defendant erroneously states, "Detective Lucas 
positively identified Mr. Ramos in court, and that identification 
was not challenged bv the defense." Br. of App. at 20 (emphasis 
added). As demonstrated in this section, defense counsel based 
her entire argument on the theory that Detective Lucas 
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MS. REMAL: You haven't participated in 
viewing people in a line up to try and 
identify which person was involved with Mr. 
Garcia and the transaction in this case, have 
you? 
DET. LUCAS: It wasn't necessary. 
MS. REMAL: Have you viewed a photo spread, a 
series of photographs, to see if you could 
identify that person? 
DET. LUCAS: It took only one to identify it. 
MS. REMAL: And what photograph was that? 
DET. LUCAS: I am afraid that if I mention 
that it may prejudice the jury. 
MS. REMAL: Well, you saw a photograph of 
only Mr. Ramos, would that be accurate? 
DET. LUCAS: Yes, it was provided to the 
County Attorney. 
MS. REMAL: And you didn't see that in 
conjunction with six or seven other 
photographs from which you had to select one; 
is that right? 
DET. LUCAS: That is correct. 
(R. 439-40).7 
On redirect, the State asked the detective how he 
identified defendant. Detective Lucas stated that on the day of 
drug deal he found a prescription bottle with the name of Maximo 
Ramos, he also discovered that the phone in defendant's room was 
listed as "Rolando Ramos" (R. 442) . He subsequently checked 
misidentified defendant as the person who handed him the cocaine. 
7Defense counsel must have known of the existence of the mug 
shots. She filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of Mr. 
Ramos's prior convictions (R. 29). Therefore, counsel was aware 
that the police would have mug shots of the defendant. 
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"with other law enforcement agencies, who had a record of Mr. 
Ramos and was able to come up with a photo." (R. 442-43). 
Detective Lucas then identified exhibit three as "a copy of the 
photo that I obtained from an outside agency reflecting the 
individual that had his residence at 510 New Grand Hotel." (R. 
443) addendum B. Detective Lucas further testified that he 
obtained the photo "[w]hen I had information that we did have 
additional records of interacting with them, I would have ordered 
the photograph at that time and it would have taken two or three 
days to obtain it" (R. 446).8 
In his brief, defendant suggests that this Court adopt 
the three pronged test announced in United States v. Harrington, 
490 F.2d 487 (2nd Cir. 1973). Br. of App. at 17-26. However, 
this case does not present a situation where that test applies. 
As the Second Circuit noted, "if the defendant should take the 
stand or be responsible, without proper reason, for placing his 
prior record before the jury, then different rules would apply." 
Id. at 495 n. 3. This distinction has not been lost by the 
courts defendant cites in support for adoption of this test. Br. 
of App. at 17-26. See United States v. Fosher, 568 F.2d 207, 
209-10 (1st Cir. 1978) (error where, on direct examination, "the 
defendant never objected to any of this testimony elicited 
to lay a foundation for the admission of the photographs. To the 
extent that defendant's argument is based on the fact that his 
prior contact with law enforcement was prejudicial information 
that should have been kept from the jury, he waived that argument 
by not objecting to this line of questioning. State v. Johnson, 
774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989). 
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government tendered into evidence the mug shot of defendant . . . 
" ) ; United States v. Bowers, 567 F.2d 1309, 1314 ( 5th Cir. 1978) 
(defendant "invited any error that occurred in [the mug shots] 
admission . . . ") cert, denied, 435 U.S. 976 (1978); Holsclaw v. 
State, 364 So.2d 378, 379 (Ala. Cr. App. 1978) (error where State 
introduced mug shots during case in chief); State v. Kelly, 526 
P.2d 720, 729 (Ariz. 1974) (harmless error for trial court to 
admit picture during direct examination of witness by state) 
cert, denied, 420 U.S. 935 (1975); People v. Pickett. 571 P.2d 
1078, 1083 (Colo. 1977) ("The photographs were not introduced 
into evidence on direct examination of Janet Little, but only 
after extensive cross-examination concerning her photographic 
identification of defendant"); State v. Kutzen, 620 P.2d 258, 261 
(Haw. Ct. App. 1980) (error where mug shots were introduced by 
government in case in chief); People v. Clark, 297 N.E.2d 395, 
396 (111. App. Ct. 1973) (same); Redd v. Commonwealth, 591 
S.W.2d 704, 706 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (same); People v. Travier, 
197 N.W.2d 890, 892 (Mich. 1972) ("where, as here, defense 
counsel has made an issue of the witness's ability to recognize 
the defendant from the picture he was shown by police, it was not 
improper for the trial court to admit the photos"); Sloane v. 
State, 437 So.2d 16, 18 (Miss. 1983) (error where photographs 
introduced during direct examination); Ingram v. State. 755 P.2d 
120, 123 (Okl. Crim. App. 1988) (court recognizes that different 
test applies when defendant takes stand); State v. Denson, 237 
S.E.2d 761, 762 (S.C. 1977) (State introduced three of fourteen 
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mug shots used by witness to make identification) but see State 
v. Robinson, 262 S.E.2d 729, 730 (S.C. 1980) ("the defense had 
placed great emphasis on [the] failure to identify [defendant] . 
. .• On redirect examination, the State properly brought out 
[the] earlier identification of [defendant] . . .. The 
photographs were introduced to show the jury that the 
photographic identification was reliable). 
B. The Identity of Defendant was the Main 
Issue Below 
Moreover, State v. Albretsen, 782 P.2d 515 (Utah 1989) 
deals directly with defendant's claim that the pictures were not 
admissible to prove identity: 
The lower court correctly ruled that the mug 
shots were admissible for purposes of 
establishing identity. Even though we 
recognize that under Rule 403, they could 
still be excluded, the mug shots here were 
crucial in establishing the identity of 
defendant, which was the main issue. 
Id. at 517; Cf^ State v. Green, 578 P.2d 512, 514 (Utah 1978) 
("if evidence serves some legitimate purpose as to proof of the 
crime, or in bearing on the credibility of evidence, the fact 
that it may show the commission of another crime will not render 
it inadmissible"). 
Defendant asserts that Albretsen is distinguishable on 
its facts. Br. of App. at 15-17. However, as recognized by 
counsel and the trial court below, the identity of the person 
accompanying Detective Lucas to the cocaine buy was the crucial 
issue at trial (R. 364, 377-82, 399-401, 439-440, 441-46, 490, 
555-57, 558, 571-73, 575) . Defendant ignores this by arguing on 
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appeal that his alibi theory meant that identification was not an 
issue below. Br. of App. at 16. However, any alibi theory 
places the identity of the person who handed Detective Lucas the 
cocaine directly at issue. 
Moreover, defendant's entire defense was based on his 
theory that "[t]hey have the wrong guy." (R. 362). During 
opening argument, defense counsel stated "Maximo was not with 
Det. Lucas selling drugs. He wasn't riding around with him 
trying to help him find a place to buy drugs." (R. 364). 
Defendant further argued in closing argument that, "Det. Lucas 
tells us that Maximo was there with him, with this other fellow 
Pedro Garcia, and there was this drug transaction that took 
place. Maria and Maximo tell us that is not the case at all." 
(R. 575). Therefore, the only issue at trial was whether or not 
Detective Lucas's identification of defendant was accurate. 
The Utah Supreme Court's holdings in Albretsen and 
Barney dispose of this issue on appeal. The evidence was 
introduced in response to defendant's cross-examination of 
Detective Lucas and for the purpose of identifying defendant as 




THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY LIMITED IRRELEVANT 
AND REPETITIVE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DETECTIVE 
LUCAS 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
limiting defendant's irrelevant and repetitive cross-examination 
of Detective Lucas. 
A. Standard of Review 
This Court reviews a trial court's decision to limit 
cross-examination under the abuse of discretion standard. State 
v. Lactod, 761 P.2d 23, 25 (Utah App. 1988) ("The trial judge has 
discretion to limit examination 'to preclude repetitive and 
unduly harassing interrogation' or to prevent parties from 
embarking on 'fishing expeditions'") (citations omitted). 
Furthermore, the defendant must demonstrate that the trial 
court's abuse of discretion prejudiced his right to a fair trial. 
State v. Maestas, 564 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah 1977) ("[slhould the 
trial court err in unduly limiting the cross-examination such may 
not be reversible error without a showing of prejudice"). See 
also State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 281 (Utah 1989), cert, 
denied, 494 U.S. 1090 (1990); State v. Starks, 581 P.2d 1015, 
1017 (Utah 1978). 
B. Defendant is Not Entitled to Unlimited 
Cross-Examination 
In Delaware v. Van Arsdall. 475 U.S. 673 (1986), the 
United States Supreme Court held: 
[T]rial judges retain wide latitude to impose 
reasonable limitations insofar as the 
Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose 
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reasonable limits such on cross-examination 
based on concerns about, among other things, 
harassment, prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation 
that is repetitive or only marginally 
relevant. 
Id. at 679. 
Furthermore, in Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 
(1974), the court held that cross examination is subject "to the 
broad discretion of the trial judge to preclude repetitive and 
unduly harassing interrogation . . . ." See also State v. 
Leonard, 707 P.2d 650, 656 (Utah 1985); State v. Chestnut, 621 
P.2d 1228, 1233 (Utah 1980); Maestas. 564 P.2d at 1388 
C Defendant's Cross-Examination of 
Detective Lucas 
Defendant conducted an extensive cross-examination of 
Detective Lucas. Specifically, defendant asked questions about 
the nature of undercover work and the methods Detective Lucas 
used to obtain evidence. Detective Lucas informed the jury that 
occasionally he would make "deals" with informants for 
information. 
Defendant specifically asked Detective Lucas about how 
he dealt with certain situations: 
MS. REMAL: Now, in relation to your 
undercover narcotics activity, you would 
sometimes use other people to assist you in 
participating in drug transactions; is that 
right? 
DET. LUCAS: Very seldom. 
MS. REMAL: Well, what I mean by that is, 
that you would sometimes use other 
individuals who were giving you confidential 
information or assisting you in some way in 
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identifying people with whom you wanted to 
deal? 
DET. LUCAS: In my particular situation, no. 
If I was to use a confidential informant, it 
was very rare. 
MS. REMAL: How many confidential informants 
would you estimate you used over the three 
years? 
DET. LUCAS: Well, in the undercover 
capacity, in the first round-up, they 
insisted that I be involved with one 
confidential informant for experience. Other 
than that, there was none in a year and a 
half. In the second group of people which 
the defendant is involved in, there may have 
been one or two that would recognize me from 
court that were brought into officials and 
they were convinced to cooperate as far as 
identifying or some other. As far as used 
out in the field for introduction, none of 
them were used for that. 
MS. REMAL: You received information from 
persons which you would then tip, if you 
will, that you would then investigate, 
correct? 
DET. LUCAS: Correct. 
MS. REMAL: And sometimes those tips from 
other individuals would result in some 
benefit to those individuals, correct? 
DET. LUCAS: I couldn't say that because I am 
not real familiar with what happened to those 
individuals. When I did come across someone 
like this that would recognize me, we would 
almost immediately enter into some type of 
agreement with them to console them because 
the utmost importance here was to preserve my 
identity. In other words, if they were to go 
on the street and tell people who I was, it 
would be over and the scope of the 
investigation was much broader than that one 
individual. So we were pretty much willing 
to do anything we had to with one person to 
preserve the integrity of the entire 
investigation. 
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MS. REMAL: And when you say you would do 
something with a person like that to console 
them, you mean you or someone involved in law 
enforcement or the prosecuting agency would 
make it worth their while in some way, 
correct? 
DET. LUCAS: I would say that is fair to say 
that. 
MS. REMAL: And the types of things that 
would make it worth their while would be that 
individuals like that might not be charged 
with crimes which they would otherwise have 
been charged with? Might that be one way? 
DET. LUCAS: It may. That is not my 
decision. That is the County Attorney's 
decision. 
(R. 413-15) (emphasis added). 
Defendant then asked, "[a]nother possible way would be 
if those individuals were already charged with something, the 
charges might be dismissed or decreased in severity?" (R. 415). 
This question is essentially identical to the prior question (R. 
414-15). The court sustained the State's objection to this 
question without comment (R. 415). Later, the court stated that 
it sustained the objection because "that line of questioning was 
too far removed from the facts of this particular case for it to 
be relevant . . . " (R. 4 93). 
This ruling was proper since Detective Lucas testified 
that he did not normally use confidential informers (R. 413). 
Furthermore, no informant testified in this case and there was no 
evidence suggesting that Detective Lucas utilized an informant in 
this case (R. 413). Given the lack of an informer, and Detective 
Lucas's testimony concerning his infrequent use of informants, 
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the trial court correctly ruled that any further questioning of 
Detective Lucas about hypothetical informants would have no 
relevance to defendant's case. 
Moreover, since the trial court could have sustained 
the State's objection based on the question's repetitiveness, 
this Court may affirm that decision on that basis. State v. 
Potter, 860 P.2d 952, 955 (Utah App. 1993). 
D. Any Error Was Harmless Beyond a 
Reasonable Doubt 
The trial court properly exercised its discretion by 
not allowing irrelevant and repetitive questioning of Detective 
Lucas. However, if this Court finds that the trial court abused 
its discretion by not allowing further questioning, that error 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986), the 
supreme court found that the exclusion of further questioning on 
cross-examination was error, but was not prejudicial because the 
evidence would not have the substantial influence of changing the 
verdict. The court held, "[w]here it is unlikely that the 
excluded testimony prejudiced the defendant's rights in a 
substantial manner, the error is harmless and the case is not 
subject to reversal." Id. at 500. 
In assessing prejudice, the supreme court has held, 
"[c]ourts have found no prejudice where information that may be 
brought out by further questioning was already before the jury 
either from the testimony of others or by implication from the 
witness' own testimony." Maestas, 564 P.2d at 1389; see also 
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State v. Patterson, 656 P.2d 438, 440 (Utah 1982) (where basic 
facts are available to jury any error in limiting cross-
examination harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); State v. 
Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218, 232 (Utah 1980) (no error where "defendant 
was able to elicit the kind of testimony he now claims he was 
prevented from obtaining"). In Maestas, the court found that 
there was no prejudice in not allowing further cross examination 
because the jury was aware of the witnesses possible motivation 
and additional cross examination would not have helped the jury 
in determining credibility. Id. 
As demonstrated above, the information defendant sought 
to elicit from Detective Lucas regarding informants was already 
before the jury. Furthermore, Detective Lucas testified that he 
rarely used informants and there was no evidence of an informant 
in this case. Therefore, any error by the trial court was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly exercised its discretion by 
refusing to excuse Mr. Scholle for cause. Prior employment as a 
police dispatcher is insufficient to raise an inference of bias. 
Furthermore, the trial court determined that Mr. Scholle answered 
truthfully when he asserted that this prior employment would not 
affect his impartiality. 
Defendant cannot complain about the introduction of 
evidence he elicited on cross-examination. By questioning 
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Detective Lucas on this issue he opened the door to its 
introduction. 
The trial court properly limited irrelevant and 
repetitive cross-examination. The question defendant wanted to 
ask duplicated a question that had been asked and answered. 
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the jury's 
determination of guilt. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
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vs. 
MAXIMO RAMON RAMOS 
Defendant Case No. 921901734 FS 
On Tuesday, March 16, 1993, the above-entitled cause of 
action came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable 
Tyrone E. Medley, a Judge of the Third Judicial District Court 
of the State of Utah, at Salt Lake County, Utah. 
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Page 68, Line 13 (According to reporter's notes should read.) 
"THE COURT: Do you think that experience, Mr. Scholle, 
that you described would prevent you from 
being fair and impartial if you were a juror 
in today's case? 
MR. SCHOLLE: It wouldn't affect my opinion. 
(NOT: It would affect my opinion.) 
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B. This Court Should Require the Defendant 
to Prove Prejudice Where the Seated Jury 
Was Fair and Impartial. 
A recent line of Utah cases holds that the error is 
prejudicial per se when a party moves to strike a prospective 
juror for cause, the strike is erroneously denied, and the party 
exercises a peremptory challenge to remove the prospective juror. 
See, e.g., Bishop, 753 P.2d at 451; State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 
25 (Utah 1984); State v. Brooks. 631 P.2d 878, 883 (Utah 1981); 
Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533, 536 (Utah 1981); State v. 
Bailey, 605 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah 1980); State v. Brooks, 563 P.2d 
799, 802-03 (Utah 1977) . This rule was announced by Justice 
Ellett in Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091, 1093 (Utah 1975). 
This Court should abandon the Crawford v. Manning rule 
for at least three reasons. First, Justice Ellett announced the 
rule without authority or persuasive analysis and thereby depart-
ed without acknowledgment from a line of well-reasoned Utah 
cases. Second, the rule has been rejected by the United States 
Supreme Court and a majority of the states. Third, the rule 
permits needless and wasteful reversals where, as here, a defen-
dant suffers no actual prejudice. 
History of the Rule. From territorial times to 1975, 
Utah did not presume prejudice. In People v. Hopt. 4 Utah 247, 9 
P. 407 (1886), aff'd 120 U.S. 430 (1887), a death penalty case, 
the Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah held that a "perfect 
answer" to defendant's claim of prejudicial error in jury selec-
43 
tion was that, of the three jurors challenged, two were perempto-
rily dismissed and the third might have been, since defendant did 
not exhaust his peremptory challenges. 9 P. at 408. Hence, "the 
defendant was not prejudiced by the ruling." Id. 
On writ of error, the United States Supreme Court 
affirmed. Hopt v. People, 120 U.S. 430, (1887). The Court held 
that any error in denying defendant's challenges for cause was 
harmless. "Those jurors were not on the jury, and impartial and 
competent jurors were obtained in their place, to whom no objec-
tion was made." Id. at 436. 
In State v. Thome, 41 Utah 414, 126 P. 286 (1912), 
another death penalty case, this Court rejected a defendant's 
claim that prejudice should be presumed where he exhausted his 
peremptory challenges and was compelled to remove a biased juror 
peremptorily. This Court stated: "To follow such a course is to 
lose sight of the fact that all that one who is on trial for a 
crime is entitled to is a fair and impartial jury, and that the 
right of challenge is given for the sole purpose of reaching that 
result." 41 Utah at 427, 126 P. at 291. 
State v. Cano, 64 Utah 87, 228 P. 563 (1924), another 
death penalty case, followed this rationale. There, "the objec-
tionable jurors were all eliminated from the panel, and did not 
sit in the trial of the case. It is quite clear," the Court 
concluded, "that no prejudice resulted from any of the court's 
rulings in that regard." 64 Utah at 101, 228 P. at 568. 
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Van Wagoner v. Union Pac. R. Co., 112 Utah 189, 186 
P.2d 293 (1947), devoted 38 West reporter column-inches to dis-
cussing this question. The Court concluded: 
The right of a party to challenge for cause 
is given for the purpose of permitting liti-
gants to obtain a fair and impartial trial by 
an unbiased jury. The right to challenge 
peremptorily is given to permit a litigant 
some latitude in removing jurors who are not 
disqualified for cause yet are objectionable 
to the challenging party. While the law 
permits some choice in the selection, it does 
not permit a litigant to have his case heard 
by a jury of his own choosing. The law seeks 
to afford both litigants a fair trial. If 
the jury as finally selected meets the test 
of being a fair and impartial jury, then the 
litigants have not been denied their funda-
mental right. 
112 Utah at 199, 186 P.2d at 298 (emphasis added). The Court 
intimated that the defendant might have been able to show preju-
dice by demonstrating that the peremptory used on the partial 
juror would have been used to remove "some other objectionable 
juror ..." 186 P.2d at 296. 
In Crawford v. Manning, a 1975 one-page opinion in a 
civil case, without discussion or serious analysis, the Utah 
Supreme Court abandoned this line of well reasoned cases. The 
plaintiffs exercised one of three allotted peremptory challenges 
to remove a venireperson who should have been removed for cause. 
The jury unanimously found against the plaintiff. In reversing, 
Justice Ellett wrote, "The juror which remained because the 
plaintiffs had no challenge to remove him may have been a hawk 
amid seven doves and imposed his will upon them." 542 P.2d at 
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1093, Justice Ellett ignored the prior line of cases noting that 
the purpose of challenges for cause is to exclude "hawks." 
Jurors passed for cause without objection are neither hawks nor 
doves, but impartial. 
District Judge Baldwin, writing by assignment in State 
v. Moore, 562 P.2d 629 (Utah 1977), followed Justice Ellett and 
held that "the failure to excuse a juror for cause and thus 
require a party to exercise a peremptory challenge to remove the 
juror was prejudicial." JEd. at 630. Judge Baldwin viewed the 
error as prejudicial because "in effect it deprived defendant of 
one of his statutory peremptory challenges . . . " Ld. at 631. 
Judge Baldwin's rationale confuses prejudice with 
error. Establishing prejudice requires an appellant to show a 
reasonable probability that, but for the error, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. State v. Verde, 770 P. 2d 
116, 124 n.15 (Utah 1989). Showing that a party was deprived of 
a peremptory challenge proves error only; it does not demonstrate 
that the error resulted in a different trial outcome. Indeed, 
where the impartial juror was removed with a peremptory, the 
defendant has cured the prejudice.11 
Post-Moore cases restated the rule without further 
justification or rationale. By 1983, the rule was "well estab-
lished." See State v. Lacev, 665 P.2d 1311, 1312 (1983). 
11
 Failure to do so should be looked upon as waiver analo-
gous to failure to mitigate damages in the civil context. 
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U.S. Supreme Court and Other States. The right to an 
impartial jury guaranteed by the United States Constitution does 
not require a rule of per se prejudice. In Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 
U.S. 81, (1988), the United States Supreme Court examined this 
issue on facts analogous to the case at bar.12 The Court "re-
ject [ed] the notion that the loss of a peremptory challenge 
constitutes a violation of the constitutional right to an impar-
tial jury." 487 U.S. at 88. It held, "So long as the jury that 
sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a 
peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the 
Sixth Amendment was violated. See Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 
436 (1887); . . . " I&. Interestingly, the Court placed primary 
reliance upon its opinion in Hopt, which affirmed the seminal 
Utah case on the subject.13 
A majority of states follow the Ross approach or other-
wise require an aggrieved party to affirmatively demonstrate 
prejudice. Sharp v. State, 837 P.2d 718, 723 (Alaska App. 1992); 
12
 In a capital murder trial, the defendant exercised a 
peremptory challenge to remove a juror who should have been 
excused for cause. The defense expended all of its peremptory 
challenges. None of the jurors who actually sat was challenged 
for cause by defense counsel. 487 U.S. at 83-84. Oklahoma law 
requires defendants to "use [peremptory] challenges to cure erro-
neous refusals by the trial court to excuse jurors for cause." 
id. at 90. 
13
 No case has ever suggested that the Utah Constitution 
mandates Justice Ellett's rule. Since partial jurors are exclud-
able for cause, Utah R. Crim. P. 18(e), a jury passed for cause 
is by definition impartial, which is all the Utah Constitution 
requires. See Utah Const, art. I, § 12 ("the accused shall have 
the right to . . . trial by an impartial jury"). 
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Pickens v. State. 783 S.W.2d 341, 345 (Ark. 1990), cert, denied. 
110 S.Ct. 3257 (1990); People v. Johnson. 842 P.2d 1, 12 (Cal. 
1992), petition for cert, filed. (May 20, 1993) (No. 92-8822). ; 
State v. Pellettier. 552 A.2d 805 (Conn. 1989); Dawson v. State. 
581 A.2d 1078, 1094 (Del. 1990), vacated on other grounds. 112 
S.Ct. 1093 (1992); Trotter v. State. 576 So.2d 691 (Fla. 1990); 
State v. Graham. 780 P.2d 1103, 1108 n.3 (Haw. 1989); State v. 
Ramos. 808 P.2d 1313 (Idaho 1991); People v. Harris. 596 N.E.2d 
1363, 1365-66 (111. App. 1992), appeal denied bv. 606 N.E.2d 1231 
(1992); Vauahn v. State. 559 N.E.2d 610, 614 (Ind. 1990); State 
v. Mavberrv. 807 P.2d 86, 98 (Kan. 1991); Williams v. Common-
wealth. 829 S.W.2d 942, 943 (Ky. App. 1992); Commonwealth v. 
Susi. 477 N.E.2d 995, 998 (Mass. 1985); Poet v. Traverse Citv 
Osteopathic Hospital. 445 N.W.2d 115, 120 (Mich. 1989); Mettetal 
v. State. 615 So.2d 600, 603 (Miss. 1993); Thompson v. State. 721 
P.2d 1290, 1291 (Nev. 1986); State v. Adcock. 310 S.E.2d 587, 594 
(N.C. 1983); State v. Blue Thunder. 466 N.W.2d 613, 620 (S.D. 
1991); Ferrell v. State. 475 P.2d 825, 828 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1970); State v. Pettit. 675 P.2d 183, 185 (Or. App. 1984), review 
denied. 683 P.2d 91 (1984); Commonwealth v. Ingram. 591 A.2d 734, 
739 n.4 (Pa. Super. 1991), appeal denied. 606 A.2d 901 (1992); 
State v. Barnville. 445 A.2d 298, 301 (R.I. 1982); State v. 
Green. 392 S.E.2d 157 (S.C.), cert, denied. Ill S.Ct. 229 (1990); 
State v. Middlebrooks. 840 S.W.2d 317, 329 (Tenn. 1992), cert, 
granted. 113 S.Ct. 1840 (1993); Jones v. State. 833 S.W.2d 118, 
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123 (Tex. Cr. App. 1992), cert, denied. 113 S.Ct. 1285 (1993); 
State v. Santelli. 621 A.2d 222, 224 (Vt. 1992); State v. Noltie. 
786 P.2d 332, 334-35 (Wash. App. 1990), affirmed 809 P.2d 190 
(1991); State v. Travlor, 489 N.W.2d 626, 629 (Wis. App. 1992), 
rev, denied. 491 N.W.2d 768 (1992); Lee v. State. 743 P.2d 296 
(Wyo. 1987). 
A minority take an approach similar to Crawford v. 
Manning, sometimes by statute, although most require that the 
aggrieved party exhaust all peremptories before prejudice will be 
found. See Boldin v. State. 585 So.2d 218, 222 (Ala. Cr. App. 
1991); People v. Macrander. 828 P.2d 234, 244 (Colo. 1992); 
Hutcheson v. State. 268 S.E.2d 643 (Ga. 1980); State v. Wacaser. 
794 S.W.2d 190 (Mo. 1990); State v. Isiah. 781 P.2d 293, 302 
(N.M. 1989); People v. Nicolas. 567 N.Y.S.2d 751, 753 (A.D. 2 
Dept. 1991); State v. Tvler. 553 N.E.2d 576, 586-87 (Ohio 1990), 
cert, denied. Ill S.Ct. 371 (1990); Gosling v. Commonwealth. 376 
S.E.2d 541, 544 (Va. App. 1989); State v. Bennett. 382 S.E.2d 
322, 325 n.2 (W. Va. 1989). 
Proposed Rule. The State proposes a return to the 
original Utah rule: where an empaneled jury was impartial, this 
Court should require the defendant to prove prejudice as in all 
other cases of non-constitutional error. Prejudice may be demon-
strated only by showing that exercise of the lost peremptories 
would have created "a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
result . . ." State v. Knight. 734 P.2d 913, 919 (Utah 1987). 
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Factors to consider in determining prejudice might 
include the ratio of "lost" peremptories between the prosecution 
and the defense, the articulable objectionable characteristics of 
the juror or jurors forced upon defendant,14 and the strength of 
the state's case. Thus, in a close case, a defendant who was de-
prived of a relatively large number of peremptories that he would 
have exercised against demonstrably prosecution-oriented jurors 
might demonstrate prejudice. 
Justice Ellett's rule invites needless and wasteful 
reversals. The Strickland-Knight-Verde standard of prejudice is 
fair and rational. Where a defendant cannot demonstrate at least 
a reasonable likelihood that an error has affected the trial 
outcome, the justice system should not be required to engage in a 
costly retrial. The instant case illustrates the vagaries of 
this rule in application. 
Assuming error in the court's refusal to exclude one or 
more jurors for cause, reversing this case under Justice Ellett's 
per se prejudice rule would be ironic for several reasons. 
14
 Peremptory challenges are generally used for three 
purposes: (1) to remove jurors believed to be biased where for-
cause strikes were denied (for example, the successfully rehabil-
itated juror); (2) to remove members of groups counsel perceives 
to be defense-prone (artists, students) or prosecution-prone (ac-
countants, military); and (3) to remove jurors for intuitive or 
unexplainable reasons (hunch, lack of rapport, unexplainable 
aversion). See Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination 
in Jury Selection: Whose Right Is It, Anyway? 92 Colum. L. Rev. 
725, 762-64 (1992) . A defendant who lost the opportunity to 
strike a juror in category (1) would be more likely to show harm 
than one who lost the opportunity to strike a juror in category 
number (3). 
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First, the challenged prospective jurors never sat. 
Second, the seated jurors passed two separate voir dire 
examinations. After the prosecution completed its case in chief 
and the defense completed 19 of its 22 witnesses, one juror 
received an anonymous note and another suffered an emotional 
episode (T. 2367, 2396). The trial court excused these jurors, 
substituted alternates, and conducted searching individual in 
camera voir dire examinations of the remaining jurors to ensure 
that they had not been tainted (T. 2428-73). This jury was fair 
and impartial.15 
Third, four of the five venirepersons at issue were 
challenged for their alleged death penalty beliefs; yet the jury 
did not decide the penalty phase. 
Fourth, where a trial court refuses to ask venire-
persons whether they would automatically impose the death penal-
ty, with the result that one or more such death-prone persons may 
actually serve on the jury, a defendant receiving a death sen-
tence is entitled only to resentencing, not a new trial. Morgan 
v. Illinois. 112 S. Ct. 2222, 2235 n.ll (1992); State v. Norton, 
15
 Defendant passed for cause 13 of the 14 jurors and al-
ternates who actually sat (R. 944-45, T. 290-309, 421-28, 472-79, 
481-92, 523-33, 558-66, 585-93, 597-604, 696-705, 713-25, 766-
73, 840-53, 873-84). Defendant's for-cause challenge of the 
fourteenth juror, Kathy Rosenkrantz, was based on her statement 
that, while she might not "vote for the death penalty just to 
ensure that the person was not ever released from prison," "that 
would be a factor that [she] would look at in deciding between 
death and life" (Tr. 870) . The court denied the challenge (Tr. 
872-73) and defendant did not peremptorily strike juror Rosen-
krantz or appeal the court's ruling. 
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675 P.2d 577, 589 (Utah 1983), cert, denied, 466 U.S. 942 (1984). 
Yet here, where the allegedly death-prone jurors never sat, and 
the trial jurors were incontestably impartial, defendant seeks to 
overturn his conviction. 
Fifth, the State's case against defendant was strong. 
And sixth, there is no reason to beli€»ve that any 
impartial but prosecution-prone jurors were forced upon defendant 
through the loss of peremptory challenges. 
In sum, defendant seeks to reverse a conviction re-
turned by impartial jurors because of opinions expressed by 
panelists who never sat on a subject the jury never considered. 
That Justice Ellett's rule in Crawford v. Manning would permit 
this absurd result is sufficient reason to overrule it. 
Absent actual, demonstrable prejudice, this case should 
not be reversed for denial of defendant's for-cause strikes even 
if the court did commit error, which it did not. 
POINT 3 
DEFENDANT'S UNTIMELY MISTRIAL MOTION BASED ON 
TIM LARRABEE'S TESTIMONY WAS PROPERLY DENIED 
A. Defendant Waived This Issue at Trial. 
Larrabee testified on cross-examination that he picked 
someone other than defendant out of a lineup, albeit with hesita-
tion (T. 1277-78).16 On re-direct he testified that after the 
16
 Without his glasses, defendant was difficult to pick out 
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December 8, 1993 
Mr. Robert K. Heineman 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: State of Utah v. Maximo Ramon Ramos 
Case No. 930305-CA 
Dear Mr. Heineman: 
Enclosed is a copy of the court reporter's correction to 
the transcript in this case which she filed with the Court of 
Appeals. Since you have indicated that this correction will not 
affect your brief, I will follow the stipulated briefing schedule 
and file my brief by January 10, 1994. 
Sincerely, 
RALPH E. CHAMNESS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Criminal Appeals Division 
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